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CASE NOTES
gressive remedial liquor control provision which prohibits the gift of
alcoholic liquor to a minor by anyone. 21 This amendment corrected in-
herently defective legislation which had prohibited only licensees from
giving intoxicants to minors.22 At this writing, no court of review has con-
strued this amendment in regard to the issue of a non-licensee furnishing
liquor to minors in a private home.23
The holding in the case at bar represents the definite trend toward liberal
interpretation of liquor control statutes. Legislation prohibiting liquor sales
or gifts to minors includes gifts of intoxicating beverages to minors at
private parties in the home. The legislative intent has clearly been to re-
strain consumption of alcoholic liquor by minors. In order to implement
the legislative intent, courts are finding it necessary to reject the statutory
rule of construction, ejusdem generis, which would place a strict inter-
pretation on the phrase any person, in favor of rules which require that
every word in a statute be construed so that none are redundant or super-
fluous. Preference for this latter construction affirms the trend toward
liberal interpretation of alcoholic beverage control laws.
James Burstein
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, S 131 (1963). It is interesting to note that the Liquor Control
Act was amended in 1965 to allow minors to consume alcoholic beverages in the privacy
of a home under the direct supervision and approval of the parents. 73rd ILL. GEN. Ass.
H. B. 470, approved August 6, 1965, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 134(a) (1963).
22 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, S 38 (1934): "No licensee shall give, or deliver alcoholic
liquor to any minor ......
23 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1963). This amendment has not been construed upto
and including cases reported in 209 N.E. 2d 648 (1965). See also, Comment, 37 CH.-KENT
L. REV. 123 (1960), wherein the commentator suggested that a non-commercial host
may be liable in tort "[d]espite reported decisions touching on the matter of non-
commercial host liability, in the face of the legislative intent and other persuasive
elements, it seems reasonable to conclude a corporate host who conducts an Office
Christmas Party or Hospitality Room serving intoxicating beverages will find itself
subject to civil damages as a tortfeasor under the Liquor Control Act." (Id. at 128.)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT SUPREME
COURT DECISION-RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF
JACKSON v. DENNO'
In 1960, Charles Huntley was tried for first degree robbery. A complete
confession by the defendant was entered into evidence, and in accord-
ance with existing New York procedure, the issue of the voluntariness
of the confession was submitted as a question of fact to the same jury
that determined guilt. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty with-
1 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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out making a specific finding as to the voluntariness of the confession,
and the defendant was sentenced to prison. In 1964, after the time for
appeal had expired and the defendant's conviction had become final, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the New York procedure
for determining the voluntariness of a confession was unconstitutional in
that due process required that a separate hearing be held to determine
whether a confession was voluntary. 2 The New York Court of Appeals
subsequently reopened the defendant's conviction and ruled that he was
entitled to a new hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of his confes-
sion, thereby giving retrospective effect to the Supreme Court's ruling.
People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1965).
The holding in the instant case illustrates the retrospective application
of a contemporary Supreme Court decision. In a technical sense, every
judicial decision is retrospective, for a decision which is purely prospec-
tive would not even apply to the parties before the court. In the present
context, the term retrospective refers to the application of a recent Su-
preme Court decision to reopen a state court conviction that had already
become final, in that the time for appeal had expired before the decision
was rendered.3 Recently, constitutional changes in the concept of due
process of law in criminal' matters have been rapid, and consequently,
the question of the retrospective effect of these changes upon prior de-
cided cases has become important. When trials which took place under
one constitutional rule of due process are challenged under a superseding
rule, the question is whether to give retrospective effect to the latter rule.
The rules of New York criminal procedure which were applied in the
instant case, and which were subsequently held in violation of due proc-
ess by the Supreme Court, had been directly considered and approved in
previous Supreme Court decisions. 4 While expanding the concept of due
process, the Supreme Court has given little consideration to the question
of retrospectivity, and, until recently, confusion existed as to whether
every newly enunciated constitutional right of due process is automati-
cally subject to an absolute rule of retroaction.
In the case of Griffin v. Illinois,5 the Supreme Court held that Illinois'
denial of a trial record to an indigent defendant was unconstitutional, but
2 Ibid.
3 For a discussion of retrospectivity in relation to constitutional law, see Bender,
The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
650 (1962). See also Torcia & King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Consti-
tutional Concepts, 66 DIcK. L. REV. 269 (1962).
4 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1963).
5351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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the Court was silent on the issue of retrospectivity. Subsequently, in a
similar factual situation, the Supreme Court, in Eskridge v. Washington
State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles,6 relied on the Griffin case to reopen
a conviction already made final in state courts. Since the Court merely
stated that a constitutional right had been denied and did not address it-
self specifically to the issue of retrospectivity, the Eskridge decision could
not serve as a precedent for a rule of general application.
When the Supreme Court further expanded the concept of due process
in Gideon v. Wainwright,7 by making applicable to the states the sixth
amendment's guarantee of an accused's right to the assistance of counsel
in criminal prosecutions, they were again silent on the subject of retro-
spectivity. Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court denied application
by several pre-Gideon prisoners seeking to set aside their convictions.
The United States Supreme Court summarily reversed and remanded the
cases for reconsideration in the light of Gideon, thereby applying the
Gideon rule retrospectively without giving the issue full-dress consider-
ation.8
The Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Denno,0 to the effect that
due process requires a separate hearing specifically on the issue of the
voluntariness of a defendant's confession, led to the holding in the instant
case. Although the Jackson decision did not mention the issue of retro-
spectivity, the New York Court of Appeals reopened the defendant's
conviction and ordered a new hearing on the voluntariness of his confes-
sion as prescribed by the Jackson decision, thereby giving the Jackson
case retrospective effect. The New York Court reasoned that the Supreme
Court must have intended that their new ruling be given such effect since
the defendant in the Jackson case was given relief in a Federal Habeus
Corpus proceeding brought long after state appellate procedures had been
exhausted.10 Hence, simply by rendering the decision in the Jackson case
within the context of a federal collateral proceeding after the conviction
had become final in the state courts, the Supreme Court had given it retro-
spective effect without discussion of the issue.
These cases illustrate the manner in which recent Supreme Court deci-
sions expanding due process were applied retrospectively. In each in-
stance, the Supreme Court applied new constitutional rules to cases final-
6357 U.S. 214 (1958). 7372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
O Supra note 1.
1OPeople v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d72, 74, 204 N.E.2d 179, 181, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840
(1965). Had the decision in the Jackson case been rendered on direct review instead
of in a federal collateral proceeding, New York precedent would have required that
only prospective effect be given to it. See People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d
99, 227 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 850 (1962).
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ized before promulgation of the rules without fully discussing the issue
of retrospectivity. Thus, the Court created a question as to whether an
absolute rule of retroaction existed in this area of constitutional adjudi-
cation or whether certain rules of due process might only require pros-
pective application. The controversy over this question reached its peak
in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio," which
held that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the search and
seizure provisions of the fourth amendment was required of the states
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Contrary to their
approach in the Grifin, Gideon and Jackson cases, the Supreme Court
was slow to indicate the effect of the Mapp rule upon prior convictions.
Conflicting views arose in the federal courts over the retrospective effect
of the Mapp case.12 It was argued that a fundamental difference existed
between the due process rights involved in Mapp and those involved in
the Griffin, Gideon and Jackson cases, and that this difference dictated
that only prospective effect be given to the Mapp case, notwithstanding
the fact that the other decisions were applied retrospectively. 13 The ra-
tionale of this argument was accepted when the Supreme Court recently
refused to give retrospective effect to the Mapp decision. 14
In ultimately deciding that the rules laid down in Mapp would not be
applied to pre-Mapp prisoners, the Supreme Court presented a complete
discussion of the issue of retrospectivity for the first time.15 After briefly
outlining the history and theory of the problem, the Court adopted the
view once expressed by Mr. Justice Cardozo that the Constitution has
''no voice upon the subject" of whether judicial decisions should be
applied retrospectively.' 6 With this as a premise, the Court continued
on to say that it must
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective opera-
tion will further or retard its operation.17
The Court reaffirmed that in illegal search and seizure cases such as Mapp,
control of the police is the desired end, and stated that such an end would
not be served by retrospective application.
11367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12 Compare Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963) (retroactive); Walker v.
Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963) (retroactive); California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891
(9th Cir. 1963) (retroactive); with Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir.
1963) (prospective); Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963) (prospective);
Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964) (prospective).
13 Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 17-20 (2d Cir. 1964).
14 Linkletter v. Walker, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731 (1965).
15 Ibid. 16 lId. at 1737. 17 Id. at 1738.
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While limiting the Mapp rule to only prospective application, the Su-
preme Court defended the fact that they had applied the rules of the
Griffin, Gideon and Jackson cases retrospectively. The Court distinguished
these cases by showing that the principles developed went to the fairness
of the trial and the reliability of the fact-finding process, whereas with
the Mapp rule, the reliability of the evidence was not in question, only
the admissibility.' 8 Thus, the controversy as to whether an absolute rule
of retroaction exists in constitutional rights cases has been settled. Retro-
spective application is not an automatic result of an overruling Supreme
Court decision. It remains a question, the answer to which will vary in
each case depending on the nature of the rights involved.
The court in the instant case was also presented with the problem of
adopting a new form of procedure for the admission of confessions into
evidence in future criminal prosecutions. Under previous New York pro-
cedure, the trial judge made a preliminary determination regarding the
voluntariness of the accused's confession, excluding it only if under no
circumstances could it be deemed voluntary. If the trial judge found the
evidence presented a fair question as to the confession's voluntariness, he
was required to receive it in evidence and leave to the jury the issues of
the voluntariness of the confession and its weight, provided the jury
found that it was voluntary. Under this procedure, the jury returned only
a general verdict of guilt or innocence, making it impossible to determine
what the jury found as to the voluntariness of the confession.19 The
Supreme Court declared that due process requires that the issue of a con-
fession's voluntariness be resolved separately from the issue of its reliabil-
ity or weight, such resolution to be made by "the trial judge, another
judge, or another jury, but not the convicting jury."20
The New York Court of Appeals, in the instant case, adopted the
"Massachusetts rule" for determining the voluntariness of confessions in
future trials.21 Under this rule, the jury passes on the voluntariness of a
confession only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the
issue against the accused. While not expressly ruling on the question of
the validity of the "Massachusetts rule," the Supreme Court of the United
States has stated that "given the integrity of the preliminary proceedings
before the judge," the Massachusetts procedure does not "pose hazards to
the rights of a defendant." 22
The instant case illustrates the changes in procedure required of state
courts in order to conform to recent Supreme Court decisions expanding
18 Id. at 1743.
19 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 1 at 379. 20 Id. at 391.
21 People v. Huntley, supra note 10 at 76, 204 N.E.2d at 183.
22 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 1 at 378.
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the concept of due process in the trial of criminal actions. In the instant
case, the effects of the changes are relatively minor insofar as they apply
to subsequent trials. In regard to criminal trials already terminated, the
effects of the changes are much greater. Through lapse of time, the task
of reproving the voluntariness of a confession can become difficult. It is
the type of task many state courts must face as the concept of due process
continues to expand.
Patrick Agnew
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF A PUTATIVE
FATHER TO VISIT HIS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Joseph Stanley was born illegitimate to Mildred Stanley on March 24,
1963. In March of 1964, Mildred brought a charge of fornication and
bastardy against the putative father, Walter Golembewski. Walter ac-
knowledged that he was the child's father, and he was ordered to pay
weekly support for the child. The mother thereafter informed the putative
father that he could no longer visit the child. Subsequently, the father
brought proceedings demanding visitation privileges. The court found
that both the mother and putative father were fit persons, that the mother
was to retain custody, and that the putative father was to be granted visita-
tion privileges. On appeal, the lower court's decision was reversed, the
court stating "as a matter of legal policy it is detrimental to the welfare of
an illegitimate child in the mother's custody to award visitation privileges
to the putative father."1 Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley,
205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
The controversial point presented for review is whether a putative fa-
ther who is a fit person should be allowed to visit his illegitimate child,
or must any relation whatsoever between the two be cut off.
Early common law considered an illegitimate quasi nullius filius.2 How-
ever, a trend toward liberalization of the common law concept has resulted
in the illegitimate being brought closer and closer to the status of legiti-
macy. These changes have occurred in three areas: inheritance, in which
I Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, _-, 208 A.2d
49, 50 (1965).
2 The doctrine of quasi nullius filius or filius populi made an illegitimate a child of the
people and not a child of any specific parent. In re Gibson, 154 Mass. 378, 28 N.E. 296
(1891), (has subsequently been changed by statute); In re Shriver's Estate, 159 Pa.
Super. 314, 48 A.2d 52 (1946). Practically speaking, the illegitimate child had a parish
which had the same relationship with the child as natural parents have with a legitimate
child. See Horner v. Horner, 161 Eng. Rep. 573 (1799). For a discussion of the medieval
common law rules concerning illegitimacy, see Adams, Nullius Filius, 6 U. TORONTO
L.J. 361 (1945).
